The risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is a persistent and complex issue, deeply rooted in their historical relationship and ongoing disputes. While a full-scale nuclear exchange remains a low-probability event, recent escalations and evolving military doctrines highlight the ever-present danger.
The latest crisis, triggered by the April 22, 2025, attack on tourists in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, which killed 26 people, quickly escalated into a dangerous cycle of retaliation. India, blaming Pakistan for supporting the militants, launched "Operation Sindoor" on May 7, targeting alleged terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistan responded with "Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos," claiming to strike Indian military bases. These actions marked a significant departure from previous conflicts, with direct missile exchanges targeting sites inside both territories and the first-time use of advanced missile systems and drones by both sides. A ceasefire brokered with US intervention on May 10th, 2025, brought a temporary halt to the fighting.
Several factors contribute to the risk of nuclear escalation. First, the conventional military imbalance between the two countries is a major source of instability. India's larger and more advanced military, ranking fourth globally compared to Pakistan's twelfth position, leads Pakistan to rely on its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent. Pakistan's military has 660,000 active personnel and a $10 billion defense allocation. Its arsenal features 1,399 aircraft, 2,627 tanks, and 121 naval vessels. While both nations maintain significant forces, India holds a clear advantage in overall military capability and strategic assets.
Second, the nuclear doctrines of both countries add to the uncertainty. Pakistan has a "full-spectrum deterrence" doctrine, including the development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) for battlefield use against Indian forces. This lowers the threshold for nuclear use, as TNWs are intended for use in a conventional conflict, increasing the risk of escalation. India, while maintaining a "no-first-use" (NFU) policy, has introduced ambiguity by stating that it could retaliate with nuclear weapons against a chemical or biological weapons attack, or if Indian forces abroad are attacked with nuclear weapons.
Third, the role of non-state actors and the potential for miscalculation remain significant concerns. The attack in Pahalgam, claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a group with links to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, exemplifies this risk. Even though Pakistan denied involvement, India's retaliatory strikes raised the specter of escalation. The risk of misinterpreting the other side's intentions is ever-present, and actions such as tactical movements or drone exchanges could be misread as preludes to nuclear strikes.
The international community has a crucial role in mitigating the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Mediation efforts, such as those led by the United States during the recent crisis, can help de-escalate tensions and prevent further escalation. Additionally, strengthening diplomatic channels and promoting dialogue between the two countries is essential for building trust and resolving underlying disputes.
The consequences of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic, not only for the region but for the entire world. A 2019 study simulated a hypothetical nuclear exchange in 2025 and estimated that 50 to 125 million people could die, with global climatic effects leading to widespread famine.
In conclusion, while the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is ever present, it is not inevitable. By addressing the underlying causes of tension, promoting dialogue, and strengthening international efforts to prevent escalation, the two countries can move towards a more peaceful and stable relationship.
