Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan has stirred discussion by suggesting that the Indian Air Force (IAF) could have significantly impacted the outcome of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Speaking at the launch of the revised autobiography, 'Reveille to Retreat', of the late Lieutenant General SPP Thorat, Gen Chauhan reflected on the strategic decisions of that era and how perspectives on warfare have evolved since then.
Gen Chauhan stated that the use of air power would have slowed the Chinese offensive considerably, potentially even preventing it altogether. He noted that the IAF possessed the capability to deliver substantial payloads with maximum weight on the enemy, owing to shorter turnaround times and favorable geography. This, he argued, would have provided the Indian Army with crucial time to better prepare their defenses. However, the government at the time reportedly viewed the deployment of the Air Force as an escalatory measure, a perception that CDS Chauhan believes is no longer valid. Operation Sindoor, conducted in May of this year, serves as a modern example of the Air Force's effectiveness, where air strikes were carried out on terror hubs in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
In addition to the potential of air power, Gen Chauhan critiqued the "forward policy" adopted by India leading up to the 1962 war. He argued that this policy, which aimed to establish forward posts in disputed territories, was applied uniformly to both Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now Arunachal Pradesh, despite the distinct differences between the two regions.
Gen Chauhan emphasized that Ladakh and NEFA possessed different histories of dispute, security contexts, and terrains. In Ladakh, China had already occupied a significant portion of Indian territory, while in NEFA, India's claim was considered stronger. Applying the same policy to both regions, in his view, was a flawed approach.
The CDS's remarks highlight a significant shift in India's defense policy over the past six decades. The present approach involves giving forces a "free hand" and being more aggressive. This is a stark contrast to the strategy employed in 1962, where the fear of escalation seemingly prevented the full utilization of available military assets. Gen Chauhan's comments suggest that a more nuanced and adaptable strategy, incorporating air power and recognizing regional differences, could have altered the course of the 1962 war.
